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AN INQUIRY INTO SEVERAL DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN
ENACTING CHINA'S UNIFORM CONTRACT LAW
Wang Limingt
Translation by Keith Hand*
Translator's Forward: In March of 1999, China's Ninth National People's
Congress ("NPC") passed the Contract Law of People's Republic of China.' The new
law is the product of nearly six years of drafting work by China's Legislative Affairs
Commission and contains over 400 articles, including 129 general contract provisions
and 299 articles dealing with specific types of contracts.2 When the law takes effect on
October 1, 1999, it will unify China's contract law by replacing the three principal
contract statutes currently in force, the Economic Contract Law, the Foreign-related
Economic Contract Law, and the Technology Contract Law.3 The passage of this statute
is thus a significant milestone in the development of China's contract regime.
The article translated here was originally published in the Chinese law journal
Zhengfa Luntan in 1996.4 The author, Professor Wang Liming of the People's University
of China, has written numerous articles on contracts and was intimately involved in the
drafting of the Contract Law as an NPC deputy. He is thus well qualified to provide
insight into the drafting process. For those seeking to understand the new statute, this
article provides an introduction to Chinese contract theory as well as a comprehensive
analysis of the policy considerations and practical problems that influenced the drafters of
the Contract Law. Some minor revisions to the original text have been made with the
cooperation of Professor Wang. In addition, translator's notes have been included to
clarify aspects of Chinese law that may be unfamiliar to Western readers and to direct the
reader to supplementary source material.
t Professor and Assistant Dean, Law Department, People's University of China; Deputy of the
Ninth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China; Member of the NPC Finance and
Economic Committee; Fulbright Scholar, Harvard Law School.
This Article has been translated and reprinted with the permission of Professor Wang Liming and
Zhengfa Luntan [The Tribune of Political Science and Law].
J.D. candidate, University of Washington School of Law, M.A. in International Studies (China),
University of Washington, Jackson School of International Studies, 1997.
1 Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Hetongfa [The Contract Law of the People's Republic of China]
(visited May 17, 1999) <http://www.snweb.comgb/people-daily/1999/03/22/iO322001.htm> [hereinafter
Contract Law]. For an English translation of the Contract Law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Hetongfa [The Contract Law of the People's Republic of China], translated in Chinese Contract Law
Forum (visited April 24, 1999) <http://www.cclaw.net>.
2 Contract Law.
3 Contract Law, art. 428.
4 See Wang Liming, Tongyi Hetongfa Zhidingzhong de Ruogan Yinan Wenti de Tantao, Shang [An
Inquiry in Several Difficult Problems in Enacting the Uniform Contract Law, Part 1], ZHENGFA LUNTAN
[TRIB. POL. Sc. & L.], No. 4, 1996, at 49-56; Wang Liming, Tongyi Hetongfa Zhidingzhong de Ruogan
Wenti de Tantao, Xia [An Inquiry in Several Difficult Problems in Enacting the Uniform Contract Law,
Part II] ZHENGFA LuNTAN [TRJB. POL. SCt. & L.], No. 5, 1996, at 52-60.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental legal rule of a market economy is that contract
law regulates transactional relationships and upholds transactional order.
Following the promulgation of the Economic Contract Law in 1981, China's
legislature enacted the Foreign Economic Contract Law and then the
Technology Contract Law, thus creating the "three pillars" of contract law.
As these laws were passed, the State Council and many ministerial
committees passed a large body of contract rules corresponding to each of
them. In 1986, the legislature enacted the General Principles of the Civil
Law ("GPCL"). The passage of the State Council rules and the GPCL
represented major steps in the process of improving China's obligation and
contract laws. The three pillars, however, suffer from duplicative,
inconsistent, and even contradictory provisions and lack some of the most
fundamental rules and institutions of standard contract relations. As such,
China's contract legislation has not yet adapted to the needs of its market
economic development and legal construction. In consideration of this
problem and in order to unify and improve upon the three pillars of contract
law, China's legislature has decided to enact a Uniform Contract Law.5
While participating in this great legislative process that has been watched
around the world, I have worked to combine the relevant doctrine and
judicial practice and have grappled with some of the difficult problems
encountered in enacting the Uniform Contract Law. The following paper
contains some of my evolving ideas on these problems.
II. THE CONCEPT OF CONTRACT
The first task in enacting a Uniform Contract Law is to inquire into
the concept of contract. The concept of contract should not be discussed
merely for some academic or logical end, but more importantly to clarify the
normative scope and content of the contract law. Put another way, given the
wide use of contracts in all areas of life and society, China must first
consider the following question: what concept of contract should be adopted
5 For problems concerning the enactment of the Uniform Contract Law, see Zhang Guangxing,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa de Qicao [The Draft Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China], FAXUE YANJIU [STUD. L.], No. 5, 1995, at 3-14; Liang Huixing, Zhongguo Hetongfa Qicao
Guocheng Zhong de Zhengyidian [Disagreements in the Process of Drafting China's Contract Law],
FAXUE [L. Sc!.], No. 2, 1996, at 13-15; Translator's Note: During the drafting process, the Contract Law
was referred to as the Uniform Contract Law.
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in the Uniform Contract Law? What contracts should it cover and what
contractual relationships should it regulate?
Presently, three different concepts of contract exist in China's theory
and practice circles. The first is the broad concept of contract. According to
this view, contracts are agreements that determine rights and duties. In other
words, the parties only need to reach an agreement that determines rights
and duties for a contract to exist, regardless of what area of the law or type
of legal relationship is involved. Therefore, contracts include administrative
law, labor law, and international law contracts in addition to civil law
contracts.
The second is the narrow concept of contract. According to this view,
a contract is specifically a civil law contract. "A contract (agreement) is the
juristic act6 of expressing a uniform intent to establish, modify, or rescind a
civil rights-duty relationship between the parties." 7  Therefore, only
agreements that determine civil rights and duties can be called contracts.
While administrative law, labor law, and international law contracts are also
called contracts, they should be strictly distinguished from civil law
contracts.
The third is the narrowest concept of contract. Under Article 85 of the
General Principles of the Civil Law ("GPCL"), "A contract is an agreement
between the parties to establish, modify, or rescind their civil relations."
8
Under the narrowest concept of contract, Article 85 does not refer to all civil
law contracts. Instead, "civil relations," refers only to obligation rights and
duties.9 Contracts are clearly established as a source of obligation in the
GPCL (Article 84) because the GPCL provisions on contracts are contained
in the part of the law dealing with obligations. Moreover, Chinese civil law
does not recognize what are called juristic acts involving real rights.'
0
Finally, under Chinese law, a consensus not involving an obligation rights-
6 Translator's Note: A juristic act is an act "designed to have a legal effect, and capable thereof," or
"an act of a private individual directed to the origin, rescission, or alteration of a right." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 853 (6th ed. 1990).
7 MINFA YUANLI (PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] 259 (Tong Rou ed., 1986).
8 Translator's Note: For an English translation of this statute, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Minfa Tongze [The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China], translated in
JEROME A. COHEN ET AL., CONTRACT LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29-48 (1988).
9 Translator's Note: The parties to an obligation rights contract (zhaiquan hetong) create specific
rights and duties between them, the performance of which can be demanded by the other contracting party.
See Ling Bing, Civil Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 211 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xiachu
eds., 1997).
10 Translator's Note: Unlike the civil codes of most countries, China's GPCL does not contain a
separate section on rights over things. The GPCL does contain provisions on ownership and property rights
related to ownership in its section on civil rights. See Ling Bing, supra note 9, at 199.
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duty relationship (such as marriage or divorce) cannot be called a contract."
Therefore, contracts can only be obligation rights contracts.'
2
I think that in discussing the concept of contract, it should be clarified
that a contract is most importantly the legal form of a transaction.' 3 As
Marx pointed out, "This specific relationship, created by means of an
exchange and in an exchange, came to take the legal form of contract."'
14
Transactions are exchanges of property and interest among independent and
equal market actors. Transactions include transfers of commodities, trades
of goods, and exchanges of interests. The legal form of these transactions is
the contract. If contracts are viewed primarily as reflections of transactional
relationships created between civil entities, then administrative contracts that
reflect administrative relations and labor contracts that reflect labor relations
do not belong in the category of what I call contracts. The reason is that
these contracts do not reflect transactional relationships. From this
perspective, I do not advocate the adoption of the broad concept of contract.
In particular, if the broad concept of contract is adopted in the Uniform
Contract Law, it would simply not be possible to determine the law's
specific normative object and content. Under such a broad concept of
contract, the Uniform Contract Law would include everything, its content
would be unwieldy and complex, and its structure would be confusing. This
is simply not desirable.
The narrowest concept of contract regards contract as a category of
civil law, which is undoubtedly correct. However, this view limits contracts
to only obligation rights contracts; it holds that only a consensus creating an
obligation rights-duty relationship is a contract. This concept of contract is
clearly too narrow. If it is adopted, then the normative scope of the Uniform
Contract Law would be severely restricted and it would be difficult to
regulate many civil contractual relationships.
In particular, under China's present legislative and judicial practice,
many contracts like mortgages, pledges, state land-use contracts, and
contractor agreements' 5 are not considered obligation rights contracts. In
German law, these contracts are called property rights contracts because they
i LIANG HUIXING, MINFA XUESHUO PANLI Yu LIFA YANJIU [CIVIL LAW THEORY, PRECEDENT AND
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH] 244 (1993).
12 Id.
13 In French, the word for contract is contract or pacte. In German, it is vertrag or kontrakt. These
are all derived from the Roman law term contractus, which means mutual exchange.
14 MAKESI, ENGESI QUANJI [COLLECTED WORKS OF MARX AND ENGELS] 422-23.
"S Translator's Note: The Chinese term translated here is chengbao hetong. In this context, it is
probably used to describe a contract like an agricultural production contract. It can also refer to a contract
signed by a general contractor.
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establish, modify, or transfer property rights. Although the concept of a
property rights contract is not recognized in China's civil legislation and
judicial practice, many scholars believe that the contracts listed above differ
from obligation rights contracts in some respects.1 6  However, it is
inappropriate to conclude that because these contracts are not obligation
rights contracts they should not be treated as contracts nor regulated by the
Uniform Contract Law. These contracts, by their essential nature, still
reflect transactional relationships and should naturally be regulated by
contract law.
In civil law, some joint acts like partnership contracts and joint
venture contracts are not simple obligation rights contracts.' 7 As early as
1892, the German scholar Kunze proposed that acts of agreement (qiyue
xingwei) and acts of contract (hetong xingwei) should be distinguished.
According to Kunze, bilateral juristic acts should be called agreements,
while joint acts (such as partnership contracts) should be called contracts.
Some older scholars in China have noted that contractual acts differ from
ordinary acts of agreement.' 8 I think that partnership contracts and joint
operation contracts are not the same as ordinary obligation rights contracts.
The purpose of the parties in concluding these contracts is not to create
obligation rights or duties but to establish relationships for joint investment,
operation, or risk allocation. However, the contract law should regulate
these contracts because in essence they still reflect transactional
relationships.
Finally, with the development of society and the economy, many new
contractual relations will emerge as conditions require. In order to bring
each new contract within the contract law's scope of regulation, the
applicable scope of the contract law and the meaning of a civil contract must
be broadened; contracts cannot be limited to only obligation rights contracts.
China's judicial practice of applying contract rules to agricultural supply
contracts (which has proven both possible and necessary in practice) is
enough to illustrate this point.
16 Sun Jingzhong, Budong Chanwuquan Qude Yanjiu [Research on the Acquisition of Real Property
Rightsi, MINSHANGFA LUNCONG (J. CIv. & COM. L.], No. 3, at 63.
Translator's Note: For example, partnership contracts differ from ordinary obligation rights
contracts because in a partnership contract, the parties contribute capital jointly, manage the partnership
jointly, and have common objectives and interests. In an ordinary obligation rights contract such as a sales
contract, the goals of each party are different. One party is interested in money and the other party is
interested in goods. There is no joint objective, only a bilateral obligation. For this point and a more
detailed discussion of the special characteristics of partnerships and joint venture contracts, see BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW IN CHINA 79, 306 (William C. Jones trans., M.E. Sharpe 1989).
18 FALU DA CIDIAN [LEGAL DICTIONARY] (Wang Hanzhang ed., 1934).
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In all, I think that in practice, Article 85 of the GPCL, which provides,
"A contract is an agreement by the parties to establish, modify, or rescind
civil relations," adopts the narrow concept of contract. The Uniform
Contract Law should follow the GPCL by adopting this concept and should
place within its regulatory scope any agreement that establishes civil rights
and obligations between equal parties.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Freedom of contract is the freedom enjoyed by parties to conclude a
contract according to the law, to choose a partner in contract and the terms
of the contract, to modify or rescind a contract, and to establish the form of a
contract. Freedom of contract is the most fundamental principle of contract
law in Western nations. Scholars have various views on the issue of whether
or not China's current contract legislation has adopted this principle.
Since the founding of its centralized economy, China has consistently
emphasized the importance of the state plan in its contract law. The 1981
Economic Contract Law ("1981 ECL") stressed that in forming contracts,
the parties should adhere to the principles of voluntariness, equality, and
mutual benefit through consultation. 19 However, this law also stressed that
the state plan must be respected and that the intervention of state organs in
all aspects of contracting must be accepted. In this respect, the principle of
freedom of contract was not embodied in the law. Consequently, many
Chinese legal textbooks recognized only the principles of voluntariness and
unanimity through consultation and did not recognize the principle of
freedom of contract.2 °
I think that the Uniform Contract Law should clearly affirm the
principle of freedom of contract and that this principle should be fully
manifested in all aspects of contract law. The spirit of contract freedom is
embodied in the principles of equality, consultation, and equivalency of
value. However, it is not completely encompassed within these principles.
Freedom of contract should be manifested not only in the decision to
19 Translator's Note: For an English translation of the 1981 Economic Contract Law, see Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Hetongfa [The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China],
translated in COHEN, supra note 8, at 49-61. The provision of the 1981 ECL referred to in the text is
Article 5, which states, "In concluding an economic contract, the parties must implement the principles of
equality and mutual benefit, achieving agreement through consultation and making compensation for equal
value. No party may impose its will on the other party (or parties) and no unit or individual may illegally
interfere." Id.
20 HETONGFA TONGLUN [A GENERAL SURVEY OF CONTRACT LAW] 38 (Liu Ruifu ed.); ZHONGGUO
DANGDAI HETONGFA LuN [ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CONTRACT LAW] 34 (Su Huiyang ed.).
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conclude a contract but also in the establishment of a contract's form, the
terms of a contract, contract modification and rescission, and even the
remedies for breach of contract.
Why should China's Uniform Contract Law adopt freedom of contract
as a fundamental principle? I think that establishing the principle of
freedom of contract is essential for stable reform and the development of a
market economy. With the narrowing scope of the state plan and the
expansion of enterprise autonomy, parties enjoy greater freedom of contract
with each passing day. In 1993, China's legislature amended the 1981 ECL.
One of the important objectives of China's legislature in amending the law
was to confirm the expansion of contract freedom that has occurred as a
result of China's economic reform. All but two of the 1981 ECL's ten
clauses containing references to the state plan were removed in the amended
version of the law. In particular, Article 4, which read, "the conclusion of
economic contracts must comply with state law and accord with the
demands of the state plan and policy," was changed to "the conclusion of
economic contracts must comply with state law and administrative
regulations.",2' Article 7, which stated, "contracts that violate the law and
the state policy and plan" are void, was changed to "contracts that violate the
law and administrative regulations" are void. These changes imply that the
principle of state planning is no longer a fundamental principle of China's
contract law.
To the greatest extent possible, the amended ECL ("1993 ECL") has
also reduced the power of the government to intervene unnecessarily in
contractual relationships. One of the basic aims of amending the 1981 ECL
was to enhance the freedom of contract enjoyed by contracting parties. This
is clearly essential to reform and to the development of a market economy.
Respect for the contract freedom of market actors is a precondition of
market economic development. As the freedom enjoyed by contracting
parties broadens, the flexibility and self-governing nature of the market will
be strengthened. Transactions will be promoted and, with the development
of the market, society's wealth will be increased. Therefore, freedom of
contract is a basic and necessary condition for the development of
transactional relationships under market economic conditions. Any contract
law that regulates transactional relationships should adopt freedom of
contract as its fundamental principle. Whether the Uniform Contract Law
21 Translator's Note: For an English translation of the 1993 Economic Contract Law, see Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Hetongfa [The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China],
translated in I China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.), 5-500 (2) (1993).
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confirms the principle of freedom of contract is thus an important symbol of
whether the law reflects the needs of China's market economy.
Respect for freedom of contract should be manifested in all aspects of
the contract law. In particular, the emphasis of the Uniform Contract Law in
implementing the principle should be to resolve the following issues. First,
on the issues of contract formation and validity, government and
administrative intervention should be reduced to the greatest extent possible.
For example, government administrative bodies should not enjoy the power
to confirm the validity of contracts under the law. Such power to supervise
and examine contracts should be tightly restricted. Moreover, the law
should prevent administrative bodies from arbitrarily restricting or
interfering with the contract freedom of parties. Second, the law should
fully respect the free will of contract parties with regards to the terms of the
contract. Contracts should not be declared void simply because they do not
contain a certain clause (such as a clause setting liability for breach) unless
the clause must be present according to the law or by virtue of the nature of
the contract. Third, on the form of a contract, the validity of oral contracts
should not be denied unless the law requires that the contract be approved
and registered. Oral contracts should be recognized as valid if one of the
parties proves the existence and specific terms of the contract according to
the evidence or if both sides acknowledge the contract and its terms. Fourth,
on the issue of contract rescission, the parties should be permitted to
establish a right of rescission when they conclude the contract. After the
contract has become effective, the party with the right of rescission should
be permitted to exercise this right and to rescind the contract if the
conditions for rescission arise. Fifth, with regards to liability for breach, the
validity of clauses setting liquidated damages and compensation for losses
should be fully respected. Unless the liquidated damages are excessively
large or small, the clause should be regarded as valid even the damages it
sets do not conform to those set by law.
IV. CONTRACT RELATIVITY
Related to the concept of contract and to the principle of contract
freedom is the rule of contract relativity. A contract, as an agreement by the
parties to establish, modify, or rescind a civil law rights-duty relationship,
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can only come about between two parties that have voluntarily concluded a
contract. This is the rule of contract relativity.
22
In continental law, contract relatively is commonly referred to as the
relativity of an obligation. According to the rule of relativity, contractual
relations can only come about between the respective parties to a contract.
Only a contracting party has the ability to make requests to and bring suits
against the other party on the basis of the contract in question. Third persons
who do not have a rights-duty relationship with the parties can neither make
requests nor bring suits on the basis of the contract and thus should not
assume contractual obligations or liabilities. Moreover, a third party cannot
assert a contractual right unless such a third party right is provided for by
law or in the contract.
Whether the Uniform Contract Law should emphasize the rule of
contract relativity is a significant issue. Many scholars harbor suspicions
about the importance of this rule because it has already been limited a great
deal. In one respect, the establishment of the obligation preservation
system 23 gives external validity to contractual relationships and can cause
contract obligation rights to be legally binding on third parties. In another
respect, with the development of modem product liability, many countries'
statutes and case law have expanded the protection of the contractual
relationship to third persons in order to protect the interests of consumers.
Under the law of these countries, product manufacturers and sellers assume
warranty obligations and liabilities with regards to third persons (such as
users or possessors of the product). For example, the "agreement adding
protection to third persons" in German law, the "right of direct suit" in
French law, and "warranty liability" in American law are all violations of the
rule of contract relativity.
22 Translator's Note: In other words, a "relative" right (xiangduiquan) is an in personarn right. For a
more detailed discussion of the concept of relativity, see BIJIAO MINFAXUE [COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVIL
LAW] 78-79 (Li Shuangyuan &Wen Shiyang eds., 1998).
23 Translator's Note: According to Professor Wang, two articles in the final draft of the Contract
Law relate to the obligation preservation system. The first, Article 73, states, "If an obligor harms an
obligee by failing to exercise its obligation rights, the obligee may, in its own name, petition a people's
court to exercise the obligation rights of the obligor by way of subrogation, unless such rights are the
exclusive rights of the obligor." Contract Law art. 73 supra note 1. Article 74 states:
If an obligor waives its rights or transfers its assets without consideration, the obligee may
petition a people's court to void the obligor's acts. If the obligor transfers any of its assets at a
manifestly and unreasonably low price, resulting in harm to its obligee, and the transferor is
aware of this situation, the obligee may also petition a people's court to void the obligor's acts.
Cancellation rights exercised by the obligee shall be limited to the extent of the obligee's right to
performance. The necessary expenses for the obligee's exercise of its cancellation right shall be
bome by the obligor.
See Contract Law art. 74. supra note 1.
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I think that the relativity of contract is determined by the essential
characteristics of contracts as well as by the principle of freedom of contract.
Contract relativity is a type of civil legal relation. In fact, the principal
difference between a contract obligation right and a property right is that
contract obligation rights are relative while property rights are absolute in
nature. Both of these characteristics are important in their respective areas
of the law. For example, in the law of obligations, the rule of relativity
applies to the establishment, modification, and transfer of relevant
obligations. In the law of property rights, the registration system and the
system for claiming rights in property are based on the absolute nature of
property rights. Thus, in order to understand the distinct characteristics of
obligation rights and property rights, one must first understand the relativity
of obligation rights.
The fundamental difference between the law of delicts24 and the law
of contracts lies in the absolute nature of property rights and the relativity of
obligation rights. Contract obligation rights are not rights of a public or
societal nature (sozialoypisch offenkundig keig) because they are relative
rights that only come about between specific persons. The realization of
such rights depends upon the performance of the obligor's duty. Thus, only
contract law can protect contract rights. However, property rights are
absolute rights that must be enforced under the law of delicts. Thus, the law
of delicts has its own structure based on its guarantee of property rights and
other absolute rights. Denying the relativity of contract constitutes a threat
to the internal structure of the civil law.
In China's judicial practice, the need to emphasize the rule of contract
relativity is apparent. Presently, the rule of contract relativity is not strictly
observed in many contracts cases. For example, some local courts have
ordered people to perform the duties of an obligor or to assume liability for
breach of a contract even when these people have had no obligation to a
contracting party or direct connection to the dispute. The courts have done
this in order to protect local interests. Thus, in judicial practice, relativity
must be emphasized in order to determine liability properly and to handle
disputes according to the law.
The rule of contract relativity should be recognized as an important
element of the law and should be manifested throughout the Uniform Contract
24 The term delict is a civil law term similar in meaning to "tort" but with a wider application. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 427. In Chinese law, delictual liability "refers to a subject of
civil law infringing on the property or personal rights of another or on his intellectual property rights." For
this point and a further discussion of the differences between contractual liability and delictual liability in
the civil law of China, see BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW IN CHINA, supra note 17, at 46-49.
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Law. In this respect, relativity of contract is still an important contract
principle. However, because contract relativity is not an abstract standard but
is a concrete rule of behavior that regulates transactions, it differs from a
principle. The question is, which substantive rules of contract relativity should
be established in the Uniform Contract Law? I think that at a minimum, the
Uniform Contract Law should include the following rules. First, except as
otherwise provided in the law, a contracting party, on the basis of a contract,
may only make requests to and bring suit against the other contracting party.
The contracting party may not make requests to or sue a third person if they do
not have a contractual relationship with this person. Second, except as
otherwise provided for in the law or the contract, a third person who is not a
contracting party may not assert a right under the contract. Third, no
contracting party may obligate a third person by contract without their
permission. Fourth, the contract obligor should be responsible for the mistakes
of her legal representative or other persons who assist her in performing the
contract obligations. Fifth, if the acts of a third person prevent the contract
from being performed completely, the obligor should be liable to the obligee
for breach of contract and afterwards may seek compensation from the third
person. Sixth, the obligor should only be liable to the obligee, and not to the
state or to a third person, for breach of the contract. Finally, except as
otherwise provided by law or in the contract, if a third person takes the place
of the obligor in performing an obligation and, through the person's own fault,
does not perform or does not perform appropriately, the obligor should still be
liable to the obligee for breach of contract.
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRACT JUSTICE
A twenty-first century Uniform Contract Law should do more than
just meet the needs of the market economy and confirm the principle of
freedom of contract. According to the trend in contract law and drawing on
the legislative experience and case law of developed countries, the Uniform
Contract Law should also confirm the principle of contract justice.
According to Mr. Wang Zejian, so-called contract justice, (also known as the
justice of an agreement), is a species of egalitarianism. Contract justice
applies to bilateral contracts and stresses that what the parties give each
other should be of equal value. In practice, this view equates contract
justice with the concepts of equal value or consideration. Although there is
25 WANG ZEJIAN, MINFA XUESHUO YU PANLI YANJIU [CIVIL LAW THEORY AND CASE RESEARCH] 23
(1993).
MARCH 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
a basis for this view, the understanding of contract justice it represents is too
narrow. Since contract justice is the collective embodiment of the ethical
and moral concepts of fairness, equality, and justice, the concept should not
be limited to equality of economic value but should have other aspects as
well. As the famous American philosopher Rawls pointed out, the principles
of justice are the outcome of a type of fair agreement or contract.26
According to the principle of contract justice, the parties should conclude
and perform the contract on the basis of fairness and voluntariness, the terms
of the contract should embody the principles of fairness and honesty, and the
contracting parties should not abuse their economic power or strength and
harm the interests of the other party.
Contract fairness is a restriction on contract freedom. According to
the rationalist philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries, contract freedom
itself implies justice or fairness. In other words, free will naturally leads to
justice. In the present century, however, the principle of contract freedom
has not fully embodied the requirements of contract justice in practice.
Contract freedom requires that the will of the parties be fully respected.
However, contract freedom does not contemplate the problems of economic
coercion that arise from disparities in the strength and position of the parties
and that result in unfairness. Monopolies and large companies, for example,
use form contracts to take advantage of consumers in a weaker position.
Similarly, enterprise managers often make use of their position to force
employees to accept poor conditions. Contract freedom must thus be limited
by the principle of contract justice before its proper function can be realized.
Preserving contract justice is, in its essential nature, a legal reflection
of the basic needs of the transactional relationship. An exchange of goods is
an exchange of equal amounts of labor. Thus, under the law of value, an
exchange of commodities between civil entities should be equal and
mutually beneficial. When the financial interest of an entity is harmed, the
entity should obtain compensation equivalent to the harm. In confirming the
principle of contract justice, China's Uniform Contract Law must ensure that
contracts adhere to the principles of fairness, equivalency of value, and
honesty. Another goal in preserving contract justice is to uphold the normal
transactional order by harmonizing the conflicting interests of different
transactional entities, individuals and the state or society, and producers and
consumers.
26 JOHN RAWLS, ZHENGYI LUN [A THEORY OF JUSTICE] 10 (1988). Translator's Note: The author is
citing a Chinese translation of Rawls' work which was published by the Chinese Social Science Press.
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I think that the Uniform Contract Law, in confirming and upholding
the principle of contract justice, should contain several features. First, the
law should regulate form contracts by providing clear rules related to the
formation, effectuation, and interpretation of such contracts. By so doing,
the law will prevent economically stronger or monopolistic parties from
harming economically weaker consumers or customers through the use of
such contracts. The legislation of many countries provides that the drafter of
standard contract clauses should call the attention of other parties to the
terms of the contract and that standardized contracts should be construed
against the drafter. These rules are worth borrowing.
Second, the law should set standards for the use of exemption clauses.
It is clear that in practice, parties with stronger bargaining positions at the
time of contract formation use exemption clauses as a tool to unfairly avoid
liability. This harms the interests of their counterparts. The Uniform
Contract Law should guarantee the fairness of liability clauses by providing
clear rules on the interpretation of such clauses and the conditions under
which they are valid.
Third, the law should prohibit abuse of interest. Honesty requires
rules prohibiting abuse of interest to be applied not only in the realm of
property law but also in contract law. Such rules will prevent one party from
abusing contract freedom by taking advantage of the economic desperation
or dire needs of another party.
Fourth, the law should uphold the principles of equality of value and
fairness. To accomplish this, the Uniform Contract Law should confirm the
rule that manifestly unfair contracts are voidable. Of course, to prevent the
arbitrary interpretation of this rule, the law should clearly stipulate the
required elements of and standards for judging manifest unfairness. This
relates to the issue of whether or not the Uniform Contract Law should
include a rule of consideration. I think that in principle, the Uniform
Contract Law should require the parties to adhere to the principle of
equivalency of value but should not require the obligations assumed by the
two sides to be of identical economic value. On an objective level, the
duties performed by each of the parties will never be of identical value.
Thus, the issue of consideration should to a large degree be decided
according to the will of the parties. Consideration should be found
objectively equal if the rights enjoyed and the obligations assumed by the
parties under the contract, as well as the respective performances of the two
sides, are of roughly equivalent economic value. At the same time, although
the amount paid by a party may be low, there is a kind of consideration on a
subjective level if the price is voluntarily accepted. Thus, the parties
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themselves can determine the standard for consideration in most situations.
Of course, in order to avoid manifest unfairness, the Uniform Contract Law
should still require that the parties observe the rules of fairness and equality
of value.
VI. CONTRACT FORMATION AND EFFECTUATION
2 7
To say that a contract has been formed (cheng ii) means that the
parties have reached agreement on the principal terms of a contract. To say
that this contract has become effective (sheng xiao) means that the contract
has become legally binding on the parties and has legal validity. Article 9 of
the 1993 ECL states, "An economic contract is formed when the two parties
achieve unanimity on the principal clauses of the economic contract through
consultation according to the law." On the surface, this article provides a
separate rule for contract formation and thus distinguishes contract
formation from contract effectuation. However, Article 6 of the 1993 ECL
provides, "when an economic contract is formed according to the law, it is
legally binding." This implies that in reality the two are not distinguishable.
From the perspective of judicial practice in China, there is no distinction
between contract formation and contract effectuation. The issue of whether
the two should be distinguished in the Uniform Contract Law should thus be
explored.
Formation is often closely connected to effectuation. By forming a
contract, the parties intend to realize rights and benefits created under the
contract. This requires that the contract be binding. If a contract does not
become effective, it is no better than a blank piece of paper and the purpose
of the parties in forming the contract is unfulfilled. Thus, the purpose of the
parties' consensus is to make the contract valid and effective. Naturally, a
contract will become legally binding if it is formed according to the law and
meets the legal requirements for becoming effective. In such cases, it is not
necessary to distinguish formation from effectuation. This statement does
not imply, however, that formation and effectuation are identical concepts.
I do not think that contract formation and contract effectuation are the
same. Formation implies that the process of concluding a contract has been
completed and that the parties have reached agreement on its principal
terms. However, the issue of formation only resolves the issue of whether a
contract exists and not whether the contract has become effective. Contracts
27 Translator's Note: For purposes of readability, the Chinese term sheng xiao. which means "to
become effective," "to come into force," or "to become valid" will be translated in some places as
"effectuation."
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that have been formed but do not meet the legally stipulated requirements
for becoming effective do not yet have legal validity. In other words, the
state's appraisal of the parties' agreement is manifested in contract
effectuation. Thus, formation is primarily an expression of the will of the
parties and embodies the principle of freedom of contract. In contrast,
effectuation embodies the state's confirmation or negation of the contractual
relationship and reflects the intervention of the state in this relationship.28
The distinction between contract formation and effectuation is
significant in four respects. First, it relates to the application of contract
interpretation techniques. Contract formation is primarily a manifestation of
the will of the parties. Thus, when contract terms are ambiguous or unclear
but the parties do not deny the existence of a contract, a court should be
permitted to inquire into the true intent of the parties and to set the specific
terms of the contract through techniques of contract interpretation.
Interpretation does not mean that a court can take the place of the parties and
create a contract. Instead, it means that the court, taking the need to
encourage transactions and to respect the will of the parties as its starting
point, can assist the parties in expressing their true intent by means of
interpretation. In contrast, the system of contract effectuation is a
manifestation of the state's appraisal of and intervention into the terms of the
contract. Thus, the failure of the contract terms to conform to the legal
requirements for contract effectuation implies that the will of the parties
does not conform to the will of the state. In such a situation, the court may
not use interpretation in order to make the contract valid and effective. On
the contrary, it may only make a determination that the contract is void.
Contract interpretation is thus used primarily to remedy defects in contracts
that have been formed and not to remedy deficiencies in the validity of the
contract.
Second, the legal consequences of non-formation and lack of validity
are different. According to the system of liability for negligence in contract
formation, if a court declares that a contract has not been formed the party at
fault should compensate the other party for damage to its reliance interest. If
the parties have already performed, then they should each return the benefits
of the performance that they have accepted. Because contract formation
relates primarily to the agreement of the parties, the failure of a contract to
be formed creates civil liability but not other kinds of legal liability.
However, void contracts fundamentally violate the will of the state. They
28 SHEWAI HETONGFA DE LILUN YU SHIwu [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC
CONTRACT LAW] 103 (Chen An ed., 1994).
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can thus create not only civil liability (such as liability for negligence in
concluding a contract and responsibility for returning improper benefits) but
also administrative and even criminal liability. For these reasons, I believe
that the common Chinese judicial practice of treating contracts that have not
been formed as void is inappropriate.
Third, with respect to the required form of contracts, it is very
important to differentiate between contract formation and effectuation.
Many Chinese laws establish rules regarding the form of contracts. For
example, Article 3 of the 1993 ECL provides, "Except where a contract is
fulfilled immediately, it shall be in written form." Article 7 of the Foreign
Economic Contract law ("FECL") provides, "A contract is formed when the
clauses of the contract are agreed upon in written form and the parties have
signed their names., 29 In academia, there are various opinions on whether
these are legal requirements for contract formation or effectuation. I think
that this problem should be analyzed concretely. If, by its nature and
according to the law, a contract cannot be formed until it is in writing, then if
the written form is not adopted, the contract cannot be formed. If the form
of a contract only relates to the issue of whether or not it becomes effective,
then the failure of the contract to conform to the legal requirements means
that the contract has been formed but cannot become effective.
Fourth, on the issue of the state intervening in contracts on its own
initiative, the distinction between formation and effectuation is significant.
The terms of many void contracts are illegal by nature and violate either
firm provisions of the law or public order and morality. Thus, the state
should intervene in such contractual relationships on its own initiative,
even if the parties do not assert that the contract is void. In contrast,
contract formation primarily relates to the issue of the parties' consensus
and not completely to the legality or authenticity of the contract terms.
Even if the terms of a contract are imperfect or unclear, the parties have
voluntarily accepted the contractual relationship. Consequently, such a
contract should be considered formed and the state should not and need
not take the initiative to intervene in it.
VII. SETTING THE BASIC RULES OF CONTRACT FORMATION
The system of contract formation includes many rules that directly
regulate the transactional process. Among these rules, the most important is
29 Translator's Note: For an English translation of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, see
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shewai Jingji Hetongfa [The Law of the People's Republic of China on
Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interests], translated in COHEN, supra note 8, at 165-69.
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the rule setting the time that an acceptance becomes effective. The two
major legal traditions adopt different positions on this issue.
According to continental law, an expression of intent to accept
becomes effective when it comes within the sphere of control of the offeror,
and a contract is formed at this time. This is called the delivery doctrine.
30
As Article 130 of the German Civil Code provides, when an expression of
intent is made to another party in non-conversational form, it becomes
effective at the time that the party is notified.31 Under Anglo-American
law,32 however, an expression of acceptance sent by mail or telegram
becomes effective when the offeree places it in the mailbox or leaves it at
the telegraph office, unless otherwise provided by the offeror and offeree.
This rule is called the sending doctrine, or, as it is commonly referred to in
the United States, the mailbox rule.
33
The primary distinction between the two rules is that each sets the
time of contract formation according to a different standard. Under the
delivery rule, an acceptance is not effective until the offeror has received
notice of it. Until this moment, the offeree assumes the relevant
consequences for the loss or delay of the acceptance by the post office,
telegraph office, or other dispatcher. In addition, if an acceptance letter is
lost or delayed, the acceptance does not become effective. In contrast, under
the common law rule an acceptance is binding on the offeree as soon as it is
placed in a mailbox or sent by telegraph.34 The offeror is responsible for the
loss or delay of the notification of acceptance by the post office or the
telegraph office. Due to this difference, the rules regarding the withdrawal
of an acceptance in the two traditions are also different. In the continental
law system, an offeree can withdraw an acceptance after notice of the
acceptance has been sent if the withdrawal is received by the offeror before
or at the same time as the acceptance. Under the common law, a notice of
acceptance is effective once it is sent and cannot be revoked by the offeree.
35
In comparing the rules of these two major legal traditions, it is evident
that both have advantages. According to the common law rule, as soon as
30 Translator's Note: The delivery doctrine, or daodazhuyi, is hereinafter referred to as the delivery rule.
3 1 Translator's Note: For an English translation of the German Civil Code see BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB], translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994). Goren's
translation of Article 130 (1) reads, "A declaration of intention required to be made by another, if made in
his absence, becomes effective at the moment when it reaches him. It does not become effective if a
revocation reaches him previously or simultaneously." Id. art. 130 (1).32 Translator's Note: Anglo-American law is hereinafter referred to as "the common law."
33 Translator's Note: The sending doctrine, or songxinzhuyi, is hereinafter referred to as the
mailbox rule.
34 Xu BING, MAIMAJ FA [BUSINESS LAW] 105-06 (1991).
35 Id.
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the offeree places the acceptance letter in the mailbox or leaves it at the
telegraph office, a contract is formed. Under this rule, contracts are formed
earlier than they are under the delivery rule. The rule thus quickens
transactions. In addition, this rule can prevent an offeree from trying to take
advantage of changes in the market that occur in the time between the
issuance of the acceptance and its revocation at the last minute, which can
harm the offeror. Under the common law rule, however, the offeror is
bound even when she does not have knowledge of the acceptance.
Particularly with regards to the assumption of liability in the case of a lost or
delayed acceptance, this rule is too harsh on the offeror and is not beneficial
in upholding transactional security. The continental law rule overcomes this
defect. However, under the continental law rule the offeree can exploit
changes in market conditions and commodity prices and engage in
speculative behavior after an acceptance letter has been sent. For example,
if market prices rise after the dispatch of an acceptance, the offeree can send
a telegram that revokes the acceptance. Thus, the continental law rule can
be abused as well. Setting a standard for the time that a contract becomes
effective is closely connected with the basic concept and nature of offer and
acceptance. Thus, choosing between these two rules is the first issue that
must be resolved in establishing the basic content and structure of the
contract formation system.
I think that the Uniform Contract Law should adopt the continental
law rule., There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, after
unification, China was a part of the continental law system and adopted
traditional continental law rules on the concept and basic theory of offer and
acceptance. In contrast, the experience of the common law was not drawn
upon. For example, the mailbox rule is related to the common law concept
that ordinary offers are not firm offers. That is to say, under the common
law, the offeror can revoke the offer at any time before acceptance. This is
not much of a restraint on the offeror. Thus, to balance the relationship and
interests of the offeror and offeree, the common law adopts the mailbox rule
for determining the time that an acceptance becomes effective.36 Judicial
practice in China, however, supports the notion that an offer has binding
force and prohibits the offeror from violating the provisions of the offer by
revoking it at will. This is obviously an adoption of the continental law
concept of an offer. Thus, the delivery rule and not the mailbox rule must be
adopted in order to balance the interests of the offeror and offeree.
36 MINFA ZHAIQUAN [CIVIL LAW OBLIGATION RIGHTS] 301 (Wang Jiafu ed., 1991).
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Second, although China's domestic contract legislation has not
explicitly provided for the delivery rule, it can be found in many provisions.
For example, Article 42 of the 1984 Regulations on Industrial Mineral
Supply Contracts states,
Except where otherwise clearly specified, the date referred to in
these regulations with respect to anything delivered directly is
the date on which the receiver signs for receipt. With respect to
anything sent by mail, the date referred to is the date stamped
by the post office on the counterslip to indicate that the goods
have been received.
Third, Article 18, Clause 2 of the United Nations Convention on the
Sale of Goods states that an expression of intent to accept an offer becomes
effective when it reaches the offeror. An acceptance is not effective if the
expression of intent does not reach the offeror within the time the offeror has
provided or, if a time is not provided, within a reasonable time. Since China
has already ratified this treaty, the adoption of the delivery rule in the
Uniform Contract Law is a great necessity.
After the delivery rule has been established, offer and acceptance
rules that are closely tied to the delivery rule should also be adopted. These
include, among others, the rule that an offeror cannot arbitrarily revoke an
offer. As for some rules that are not closely tied to the delivery rule, these
can be borrowed for the Uniform Contract Law where appropriate, even if
they are used in the common law. For example, if the acceptance changes
non-material terms of the offer and the offeror does not immediately object,
then the acceptance should be considered effective. Although this principle
is applied in American law,37 it does not directly relate to the time of
formation and can thus be borrowed for China's legislation.
VIII. VOID3 8 CONTRACTS
A void contract is the opposite of a valid contract and refers to a
contract that has been formed but lacks the legally required elements for
validity. In this situation, the expression of the will of the parties cannot
create a contract that has the validity of a juristic act. Article 58 of China's
GPCL identifies several kinds of void contracts:
" See U.C.C. § 2-207 (U.S.).
38 Translator's Note: The term wuxiao, translated here as "void," may also be translated as "invalid."
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1. Contracts concluded by a person who lacks the capacity to
perform civil acts;
2. Contracts concluded by a person with limited capacity to
perform civil acts that, according to the law, cannot be
concluded by such a person;
3. Contracts formed as the result of fraud or duress, or when
one party takes advantage of a person;
4. Contracts related to a malicious conspiracy of the parties;
5. Contracts that violate the law or the social or public interest;
6. Contracts that violate mandatory state plans; and
7. Contracts that employ a legal form to conceal an illegal
purpose.
According to Article 7, Clause 3 of China's 1993 ECL, contracts signed by
agents who have exceeded their authority or contracts signed by agents on
behalf of a principal with themselves or with other people they represent are
void. With respect to this provision, current Chinese law differs from the
traditional civil law of the continent in that it has expanded the range of void
contracts. Specifically, Chinese law provides that some contracts that are
voidable under continental law, (such as contracts that are not true
expressions of intent because of fraud or duress), are void. Under Chinese
law, some contracts of pending validity39 (such as contracts concluded
without permission by a person with a limited capacity for civil acts), are
void as well. China's current legislation thus provides for a broad range of
void contracts.
Whether the Uniform Contract Law should adopt the current
provisions on void contracts or should establish a new range of void
contracts is an important issue. China's current contract legislation, by
expanding the range of void contracts, emphasizes state intervention in
contracts and the punishment of those who engage in illegal acts such as
defrauding or coercing another person. Because the rules on the range of
void contracts are too broad, many valid contracts have been improperly
39 Translator's Note: The Chinese term translated here is xiaoli daiding de hetong. See infra note 42
and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of contracts of pending validity.
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treated as void. In practice, courts have expanded the range of void
contracts inappropriately. This has caused the number of void contracts in
China to reach a surprising level. According to scholarly studies, ten to
fifteen percent of all contracts are void.40 This state of affairs has had some
negative effects. First, it has brought about the unnecessary waste and loss
of property. Once it is established that a contract is void, liability for the
compensation of losses and for the mutual return of property that has been
discharged arises under the principle of restitution. The mutual return of
property means that the costs incurred by the parties in performing the
contract will not be compensated and that the purpose of the contract will
not be realized. It also means that property will be lost or wasted because
the return of property itself adds unnecessary costs.
Second, voiding contracts excessively is detrimental to the
preservation of and respect for the will and interests of the parties. Although
contracts concluded as the result of fraud or coercion are illegal to a certain
extent, the primary problem with these contracts is that they are not real
expressions of the intent of the parties. To respect the interests of the
victims of such contracts and to protect transactional security, this kind of
contract should be treated as voidable if the victim so requests. However, if
the victim is unwilling to demand that the contract be voided, such wishes
should be respected and the state should not intervene.
Third, the excessive voiding of contracts does not encourage
transactions. An important goal of contract law is to facilitate transactions to
the greatest extent possible, not to extinguish transactions. Only if the law
facilitates transactions can it promote economic development and the growth
of social wealth. Thus, the excessive voiding of contracts, which causes
some transactions to be improperly extinguished, is not in accord with the
principle of encouraging transactions. For these reasons, the present
legislative provisions related to void contracts should be amended. The goal
of the amendments should be to clearly define void contracts, to narrow the
range of void contracts appropriately, and thus to eliminate the negative
effects of the present system.
I think that in principle, the range of void contracts should be limited
to contracts that are illegal or that violate the public interest. A violation of
the law is a violation of a prohibitory provision in a current statute or in a
regulation issued by the State Council. Contracts that violate non-
prohibitive provisions and administrative rules issued by ministries under the
40 SUI PENGSHENG, WUXIAO JINGJI HETONG LILUN YU SHIWU [VOID ECONOMIC CONTRACTS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE] (1992).
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State Council should not be declared void. In practice, it is quite
inappropriate to. treat contracts that violate any official document (hongtou
wenjian) as a void contract. The treatment of every document from every
locale as a law or a rule that confirms the validity of contracts is "bound to
lead to a maze of transactional prohibitions, pitfalls everywhere in civil
activities, and administrative intervention with unlimited legal force that will
prevent the parties from taking a single step. '41
Contracts that violate the public interest are contracts that violate
public order and morality. Examples of these types of contracts are
contracts that violate public moral or ethical concepts, contracts that restrict
personal freedom, and contracts that injure the moral character of people.
Ordinarily, contracts concluded as part of a malicious conspiracy by the
parties to evade the law and to harm the interests of other people are also
illegal and void contracts.
If the range of void contracts is limited to contracts that violate the
law and public interest, then a contract of pending validity should be a
special type of contract that is distinguished from a void contract. If a
contract has already been formed but its validity has not yet been
determined, then it is a contract of pending validity. A person with rights
must recognize such a contract before it can become effective.42 There are
three principal types of contracts of pending validity. One type is a contract
that, according to the law, may not be established independently by a person
with limited capacity to act. A legal representative of the person with
limited capacity must recognize this contract before it can become effective.
A second type is a contract that is formed in the name of others by an agent
without the authority to form such a contract. The person represented by the
agent must retroactively recognize such a contract before it can become
effective. The third type is a contract through which a person arbitrarily
dispenses with the rights or property of another without the right to do so.
The person whose right or property is disposed of must approve the contract
in order for it to become effective. Although a contract of pending validity
lacks the elements required for it become effective, it can become effective
if a person with rights recognizes it retroactively. Before this retroactive
recognition, however, the validity of the contract is only potential. Pending
validity not only protects the interest of the person with rights but also takes
account of the interest of their counterpart. In contrast, void contracts
violate the law and thus are never valid. Such a contract cannot become
41 Wang Weiguo, Lun Hetong Wuxiao Zhidu [On the System of Void Contracts], FAXUE YANJIU
[STUD. L.], No. 3, 1995, at 16.
42 BIJIAo HETONGFA [COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW] 410 (Zhou Linbin ed., 1989).
VOL. 8 No. 2
CHINA 'S UNIFORM CONTRACT LA W
legally valid through the retroactive recognition of any person. This is the
basic difference between a contract of pending validity and a void contract.
IX. VOIDABLE4 3 CONTRACTS
Voidable contracts are contracts that can be voided at the request of an
interested party because the expression of intent at the time the parties
concluded the contract was not genuine. A majority of continental law
countries classifies contracts that are not genuine expressions of intent as
voidable contracts. According to the provisions of Article 59 of the GPCL,
if a person seriously misunderstands the content of an act or an act is
manifestly unfair, the act can be voided upon the request of the interested
party. When such an act is voided, its legal validity is extinguished. China's
civil law provides that only two types of acts involving false expressions of
intent are voidable acts of contract. Other contractual agreements that are
not genuine expressions of intent (such as those involving fraud or duress)
are treated as void agreements.
In the drafting of the Uniform Contract Law, there are two different
views on whether contracts involving fraud or duress should be considered
voidable. The first view holds that contracts involving fraud or duress are
voidable because in such situations the expression of intent is not real or is
defective. According to this view, a defective expression of intent implies
that the person expressing the intent has not done so freely. To fully
preserve the free will of these parties and to prevent parties engaging in
fraud or duress, the law should give the victims of fraud or duress the right
to void the contract. The coerced party should have the right to determine
the validity of the defective expression of intent and, after careful
consideration of the contract's advantages and disadvantages, to decide
whether or not to void it.44
The second view holds that contracts involving fraud or duress are
void. According to this view, the invalidity of such contracts is provided for
in Article 58 of the GPCL and these provisions should be adopted in the
Uniform Contract Law. The primary justification for this view is that acts of
fraud or duress not only harm the interests of the parties but also threaten the
social economic order. Thus, to safeguard the social economic order, the
relevant administrative and judicial organs should intervene in cases of fraud
or duress regardless of whether the defrauded or coerced party requests that
43 Translator's Note: The Chinese term translated here is kechexiao. The verb chexiao can be
translated as "to revoke," "to cancel," "to rescind" or "to void."
" Id. at 430.
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the contract be voided. Moreover, merely forcing the perpetrator of fraud or
duress to assume liability for returning property and compensating the
victim is not a punitive sanction. Without punitive sanctions, acts of fraud
and duress are difficult to prevent. Treating these contracts as void provides
a basis for not only civil liability but also administrative liability on the part
of the perpetrator of the unlawful act.
For several reasons, my opinion is that the first view is the most
appropriate. First, under this view the autonomy and the choice of the
victim is fully respected. In practice, contracts involving fraud or duress are
very complex. Not every act of fraud or duress will cause the victim serious
loss, however. In some situations, a victim of fraud or duress may still be
willing to be bound by a contract because the harm resulting from the
contract is not serious and because the victim is in need of the performance
of the other party. If contracts involving fraud or duress are treated as void,
however, they must all be declared void regardless of the opinion of the
victim. Thus, the wishes of the victim may not be fully respected.
Second, treating such contracts as voidable is a manifestation of state
intervention in the contractual relationship but also gives consideration to
the interests of the victim. Victims themselves decide whether to void the
contract and a court or arbitration organ ultimately decides whether the
contract is voidable. Specifically, contracts involving fraud or duress are
valid until voided. Up to this time, the parties are still bound by the
contractual relationship. This prevents one party from using fraud or duress
as a pretext for refusing to perform.
Third, treating these contracts as voidable protects the interests of third
parties acting in good faith. When a party acquires property through fraud or
duress and transfers it to a third person acting in good faith, the voiding of the
contract is not effective against this third party. Thus, the voiding of a contract
cannot serve as a basis for action against such third parties.
Fourth, the voidability of a contract is often related to contract
modification. Article 59 of China's GPCL states that voidable contracts
may be voided or modified and thus permits a party to pursue either course.
When a contract is modified, its validity is preserved. Thus, contract
modification involves only the amendment or supplementation of a contract
and does not lead to the extinguishing of the contract. By permitting a party
to either void or modify voidable contracts, the law gives the party a right to
choose whether or not to preserve the contractual relationship. In cases
where the party chooses to modify and not to void the contract, such a rule is
beneficial to the stability of contract relations and promotes transactions. If
a contract is void, then a party cannot choose to modify it.
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In the interest of encouraging transactions and reducing the waste
caused by voiding contracts, I think that a court or arbitration tribunal should
not void a contract if a party only requests that it be modified. Moreover,
when a person requests that a contract be voided but modification of the
contract would be sufficient to preserve this person's interests, and does not
violate the law or public interest, a court or arbitration tribunal should be
able to merely modify the terms of the contract instead of voiding it. In all, I
think that while contracts involving fraud or duress are not true expressions
of intent, the Uniform Contract Law should treat them as voidable.
X. MANIFESTLY UNFAIR CONTRACTS
Manifestly unfair contracts are contracts that have been concluded by
an inexperienced or pressured party and that are clearly detrimental to that
party. Article 59 of China's GPCL provides that parties have the right to
apply to a court or arbitration organ to modify or void civil acts that are
manifestly unfair. This provision has become very flexible over the years
because in practice there are no reasonable required elements defining
manifest unfairness. In practice, many contracts that are not manifestly
unfair have unreasonably been treated as voidable. As such, many scholars
think that the provision does more harm than good and that it should be
abolished. The are several principal reasons for this view.
First, the standard for manifest unfairness is too abstract and too
difficult for judges to grasp and apply. This has lead to inconsistency and
even abuse in the implementation of the law. Second, the system of
manifest unfairness is detrimerital to efforts to preserve transactional security
and the transactional order. Many parties have demanded that contracts be
voided on the basis of unfairness because they have not been successful in
their transactions. This encourages people to conclude contracts carelessly
and is detrimental to transactional security. Third, it is impossible to require
that the results of all transactions be fair to the parties. The law cannot
guarantee that the result of a transaction is fair. It can only provide
conditions for manifest unfairness.45 Many scholars thus think that in
drafting the Uniform Contract Law, the concept of manifest unfairness
should not be adopted.
It is still important for the Uniform Contract Law to provide for a
system of manifest unfaimess. In practice, many problems have arisen in
45 Shen Qingzhong, Xianshi Gongping Minshi Xingwei de Guiding Bida Lixiao [Provisions on
Manifestly Unfair Civil Acts: More Harm than Good], FAXUE [L. So.], No. 8, 1993, at 28-30.
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the application of the system of manifest unfairness. For example, the
standard has been too abstract and too difficult to grasp and apply. The
applicable scope of manifest unfairness has also been too broad. The
problem with manifest unfairness is not that such contracts should not be
voided. Instead, the problems have all arisen because specific and effective
standards for manifest unfairness have not been established in the law.
Thus, I think the view that Article 59 of the GPCL should be abolished is
inappropriate. In fact, legal confirmation that manifestly unfair contracts
should be voided has great significance for guaranteeing transactional
justice, protecting the interests of consumers, and preventing one party from
exploiting its dominant position or the inexperience of another party. (Of
course, for these functions of the system of manifest unfairness to be
realized, the legally required elements for manifest unfairness must be
perfected.)
In academic circles, there are several different views on what the
required elements for manifest unfairness should be. Presently, most
scholars maintain that the one required element for manifest unfairness is the
existence of an objective imbalance of interest between the parties and that
manifest unfairness takes only this kind of objective imbalance into account.
These scholars affirm that manifest unfairness should only be concerned
with this kind of objective imbalance. The injured party thus avoids the
burden of introducing evidence on the reasons for the manifest unfairness.
This method also guarantees civil equality and the implementation of the
fundamental principle of equivalency of value.46
I believe that this view is worthy of deliberation. First, in considering
whether a contract is manifestly unfair and should be voided, the law should
not only consider whether the result is manifestly unfair but should also look
at the cause of the manifest unfairness. If the manifest unfairness is the
result of fraud or exploitation, then the resulting contract belongs in the
category of fraudulent or exploitative contracts. Therefore, manifestly unfair
contracts are different from contracts involving fraud or exploitation. If the
cause of the manifest unfairness is not considered, it is very difficult to
distinguish between acts of manifest unfairness and other acts because fraud,
exploitation, and serious mistake can all give rise to a result that is
manifestly unfair.
Second, only considering whether the resulting contract is unfair is
inappropriate given the character and requirements of transactions. In a
46 Zhou Yuwen, Jingii Hetong de Xianshi Gongping Chusuo [A Preliminary Investigation into
Manifest Unfairness in Economic Contracts], FAXUE YU SHUIAN [LEGAL STUDY & PRAC.], No. 5, 1991.
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market economy, any party engaged in commerce should assume the risks of
transactions. Transactional failure is common, and the law certainly cannot
and should not guarantee that every party to a transaction realizes a profit.
Transactions would not be possible otherwise. Permitting anyone who
engages in an unsuccessful transaction to demand that their contract be
voided because it is not profitable, and thus manifestly unfair, would force
the other party to assume the transactional risk of. the unsuccessful party.
Inevitably, this would cause chaos in the economy.
Third, only considering whether the result is manifestly unfair will
result in a large number of contracts being handled as manifestly unfair
contracts. Under such conditions, many contracts will be voided
inappropriately and the purpose of establishing a system of manifest
unfairness will be defeated.
I think that there should be two required elements for manifest
unfairness. The first is an objective element. Specifically, there should be an
objective imbalance of interest between the parties. The second is a subjective
element. Namely, one side must intentionally exploit its superior position or
the weakness or inexperience of another party and conclude a contract that is
manifestly unfair. Only when both the objective and subjective elements are
present can one truly claim that there is manifest unfairness.
The relationship between manifest unfairness and change of
circumstance is also a significant issue. Change of circumstance refers to a
situation in which the parties have formed a valid contract but, because of a
change of circumstance for which neither party is to blame, performance of
the contract becomes manifestly unfair. In such a situation, the party can
request the modification or rescission of the contract according to the
principles of honesty and trustworthiness. From a legal perspective, change
of circumstance and manifest unfairness are closely connected. A change in
circumstance often causes the interests of the parties to become unbalanced.
If performance of the original contract becomes manifestly unfair, then the
contract needs to be modified or rescinded. In applying this rule, however,
some local courts have handled transactional risks that should be assumed by
the parties, such as fluctuations in market prices or changes in sales, as
changes of circumstance. This can be attributed to the fact that China's
current legislation lacks provisions, and especially limitations, on the change
of circumstance doctrine. Thus, I think that it is absolutely necessary for the
Uniform Contract Law to contain provisions on change of circumstance.
Until such provisions are made, the problems in current practice that have
been created by the lack of provisions on change of circumstance can be
dealt with by expanding the applicable scope of manifest unfairness.
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XI. CONTRACT MODIFICATION AND RESCISSION
From a broad perspective, contract modification refers to a change that
takes place in the terms of or parties to a contract. From a narrow perspective,
modification only refers to a change in the terms of a contract. In China's
legislation and theory of civil law, changes in the parties to a contract are
generally referred to as contract transfers. Modification is limited to changes
in content. As such, contract modification refers to a situation in which the
parties agree to amend or to supplement the contract after it has been formed
but before it has been performed completely.
Rescission generally refers to an expression of intent by one or both of
the parties that causes the contractual relationship to be extinguished from its
inception or at a later time. Contract rescission can only occur after the
contract has been validly formed and the conditions for rescission have arisen.
The two acts are often closely tied together and there are many similarities
between them. First, most modifications require bilateral consultation. This is
also a method of rescinding a contract. Second, if an event of force majeure
takes place and one party commits a serious breach of contract, either of the
parties will enjoy the rights of modification or rescission. According to one
view, in this situation there is not only an issue of the legal right to rescission,
but also an issue of the legal right to modification. The right to modification
refers to the right of a party to modify a contract when one of the conditions
for legal modification arises and an expression of intent to modify the contract
is delivered to the other party. Thus, according to this view, when force
majeure precludes performance, one or both parties have the right to modify
the contract. I think that while this view is certainly reasonable, it should be
analyzed carefully. Undoubtedly, force majeure can create a right to
modification. However, breach of contract only gives one party the right to a
remedy and does not create a right to modification. Therefore, one cannot say
generally that Article 26 of the 1993 ECL provides the parties with a right to
modification.
Third, there are similarities between the procedures for handling
modification and rescission. Modification and rescission must both be in
writing. In the case of rescission through consultation, both parties must reach
agreement. Before such an agreement is reached, the contract remains valid.47
Because of these similarities, Article 26 of the 1993 ECL provides for both
modification and rescission. Providing for modification and rescission in the
4' Translator's Note: This is also true of contract modifications made through consultation.
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same article is intended to simplify the law, but easily leads to
misunderstandings such as the notion that contract modification and rescission
are the same and thus interchangeable. Another such misunderstanding is that
rescission is a form of modification and is nothing more than a change in the
original contract that results in the complete termination of an unperformed
obligation.
I think that contract modification and rescission are two different
concepts that should be distinguished in legal theory. The important
distinctions are as follows. First, contract modification involves the
amendment or supplementation of non-material clauses of the contract and not
fundamental changes in the material content of the contract. Also,
modification does not require that the original contractual relationship be
extinguished but only involves changes to some of the terms of the original
contract. Of course, the modification of a contract creates a new contractual
relationship, but the new contract must include the material content of the
original contract. If the new contract does not assimilate the material content
of the original contract, then it is not a modification of the original contract. It
is a new contract that is formed after the old contract has been extinguished.
For example, the object of the contract is a material term of the contract.
To change the object is to alter the fundamental rights and obligations under
the contract. Therefore, in practice, the original contractual relationship ends
if the object of the contract is changed. Rescission extinguishes the original
contractual relationship but does not involve the establishment of a new
contractual relationship. After rescission, performance of the contract is not
possible, even if a party wants to perform.48 Thus, rescission implies that
some kind of transaction has been extinguished.
Second, contract modification primarily comes about as a result of
unanimity through consultation. Because the terms of every contract are
arrived at through consultation, the two parties must reach agreement through
consultation in order to modify them. Modification of the contract without the
agreement of the other party or a without a just reason cannot bind the other
party. Moreover, such an act constitutes a breach of contract. In contrast,
rescission can come about in many ways, only one of which is consultation.
Even on the issue of consultation itself, modification and rescission are
different. Article 28 of the FECL provides that "After the parties agree
through consultations, a contract can be modified." The implication of this
provision is that there must be a consultation for the contract to be modified,
'8 Translator's Note: Here, the author means that after rescission, the parties can perform
unilaterally, but the performance will not be governed by the terms of the contract.
MARCH 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
but that consultation is not necessarily required for the contract to be
rescinded.
Third, contract rescission is one type of remedy for contract breach.
After a breach by one party, the other party enjoys the right of rescission.
However, there is no connection between contract modification and remedies;
a breach of contract by one party does not give the other party a right to
modify the contract. Instead, the injured party must often apply for other
remedial measures such as rescission. Article 29 of the FECL links breach
with rescission, but not with modification.
Fourth, in terms of legal consequences, no issue of retroactivity arises in
contract modification because modification does not extinguish the original
contractual relationship. The modification is usually only valid with respect to
a part of the contract that has not been performed. That is, the party only
performs according to the terms of the modified contract. Portions of the
contract that were performed before modification are not changed. In contrast,
contract rescission extinguishes the contractual relationship and is thus valid
retroactively. In addition, if one party breaches a contract, the other party not
only has a right to rescind the contract but also has a right to damages.
Contract modification usually does not involve the issue of damages because it
is not related to breach.
From the analysis above, it is apparent that the differences between
contract modification and rescission outnumber their similarities. Thus,
China's Uniform Contract Law cannot provide for them together on the basis
of their similarities. Instead, the individual characteristics of modification and
rescission should be fully contemplated in the law, and separate provisions
should be made for each. This will help to both improve the' systems of
modification and rescission and ensure that contracting parties correctly
modify and rescind contracts. In addition, separating the two practices is
essential for encouraging transactions. If the parties can resolve their disputes
through modification, then they need not rescind their contract and should be
encouraged to modify it. Rescission is a relatively extreme practice because it
extinguishes the contractual relationship. Applying this method too often is
not beneficial to commerce and results in the unnecessary loss of property.
XII. CONSENT OF THE OBLIGOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS
An assignment of contract rights refers the obligor's act of assigning,
by means of an agreement, all or a portion of the obligation rights under a
contract to a third person. In practice, contract obligation rights are the
object of a transaction in an assignment. Such transactions are a
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consequence of the development of a market economy. Contract assignment
will also promote the free transfer and flow of investment and accelerate the
development of market transactions in China.
Generally speaking, contract assignment involves two kinds of
relationships. The first is the original contractual relationship between the
obligor and the obligee. The second is the relationship of assignment
between the obligee and a third person (the assignor and the assignee).
Although in assigning obligation rights the obligee disposes of them
according to his own will and interests, this disposition generally affects the
interests of the obligor as well. This situation creates a legal conflict of
interest. From the perspective of protecting and respecting the rights of the
obligee and encouraging transactions, the party with rights should be
permitted to assign them freely if such an assignment does not violate the
law, the social or public interest, or the contract. However, from the
perspective of preserving the interests of the obligor and the stability of
contractual relationships, the assignment of rights should be restricted
appropriately. Namely, the agreement of the obligor should be obtained.
Scholars have three views regarding how the Uniform Contract Law
should harmonize the interests of the assignor, the assignee, and the obligor
in the system of contract assignment. One view holds that an obligor must
agree to the assignment of contract rights for it to become effective. As
provided in Article 91 of the GPCL, "A contracting party that assigns all or a
portion of its contract rights to a third party shall obtain the consent of the
other party and may not profit from it." Thus, according to this view, the
Uniform Contract Law should continue to apply the provisions of the GPCL.
A second view holds that the assignment of contract rights is simply a
disposition of rights by the obligee. Thus, the consent of the obligor is not
necessary for an assignment. The third view is that although an obligee does
not need to obtain the consent of the obligor to assign obligation rights, the
obligee must notify the obligor of the assignment. Such notification
prevents the obligor from suffering damages stemming from a lack of
awareness about the assignment.
In China's legal practice, there are some rules that embody the third
view. For example, Article 21 of Several Opinions Concerning the Trial of
Loan Cases by the Peoples Court, issued by the Supreme People's Court on
August 13, 1991, states,
"[i]f a person against whom judgment is being executed lacks
the funds to pay an obligation and requests to pay the obligation
with bonds, stocks or other securities of value, approval should
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be given if the party executing the judgment agrees. Requests
to satisfy the obligation with another obligation fight must be
agreed to by the executing party, and the obligor of the person
against whom the judgment is being executed must be
informed. Such a payment should be handled according to the
relevant procedures for the transfer of obligations." 49
In comparing the three views above, it is apparent that although there
are some differences between the second and third views, neither asserts that
that obligors must consent to assignments. In contrast, the first view asserts
that obligors must consent to assignments. I think that the differences in
these views are related to a conflict of values in contract law, namely the
contradiction between efficiency and security. The view that the assignment
of obligation rights by obligees does not require the consent of the obligor
encourages the transfer of rights and considers such transfers to be a kind of
transaction. Thus, encouraging the transfer of rights is significant for
facilitating transactions, developing a market economy, and improving
economic efficiency.
However, while the view that obligors must consent to an assignment
of contract rights by the obligee restricts the free assignment of contract
rights to a certain degree, it does help to stabilize contractual relationships,
preserve the transactional order, and protect the interests of obligors.
Suppose, for example, that A and B conclude a contract for the purchase of
cement. If the buyer can assign his contract right to a third party without the
consent of the seller, the seller cannot guarantee her interest because even if
the seller is notified, she cannot know whether the third person has good
credit or the ability to pay. If the third party does not have good credit or the
ability to pay, it may be difficult for the seller to obtain performance after
delivery. Conversely, if the seller can assign her contract right to a third
person without the consent of the buyer, it is still possible that the goods
produced or handled by the third party may not conform to the quality
requirements set in the contract or that the third party may not have a good
reputation. Thus, even if the buyer is notified of the assignment, it is still
difficult for him to fully protect his interest. Of course, the law can protect
the interests of obligors through simultaneous performance or the adversarial
system, but even with such protections it is still difficult to avoid and reduce
the number unnecessary disputes.
49 Translator's Note: For the Chinese text of this opinion, see ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FALU QUANSHU [COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 272-74 (Wang Huaian
et al. eds., 1993)
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When there is a contradiction or conflict between two legal values, it
is necessary to decide which value to lean towards. I think that while
efficiency is important, it is more important to preserve transactional order
and security in China's initial period of market economic development.
Because the current contract laws and their legal enforcement have yet to be
perfected, many contracting parties lack a concept of contract and the
necessary restraint that this concept imposes. As such, contracts have not
been adhered to and a serious debt crisis exists in China; a transactional
order has not yet truly formed. In such a situation, it is necessary to stabilize
transactional relationships and preserve transactional security and order.
Transactional security and order are also fundamental preconditions
for economic efficiency. Without order, even if transactions benefit the
parties, they are inefficient from the point of view of the entire society. For
these reasons, I think that it is necessary and reasonable to regulate the
assignment of obligation rights by obligees appropriately and to require the
consent of the obligor to assignments.
In requiring the obligee to obtain the consent of the obligor to assign
contract rights, the meaning of consent should be appropriately understood.
If the obligor does not indicate his consent after he is notified of the
assignment by the obligee, then the assignment is not effective with regards
to the obligor. However, after the obligee notifies the obligor, if the obligor
does not give a clear answer within a reasonable time, then consent will be
implied and the assignment will become effective. The obligee must also
have a just reason for objecting to an assignment. If the obligor does not
have a just reason for her objection, then the obligee can apply to the court
to confirm the validity of the assignment.
XIII. ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS AND THIRD PARTY SUBSTITUTE
PERFORMANCE
Assumption of an obligation is a form of contract transfer and refers
to the assumption of an obligation by a third party on the basis of an
agreement reached between the obligor, the obligee, and the third party.
This occurs, for example, if the obligor and obligee agree that a third party
will take the place of the obligor, become a contracting party, and thus
perform the obligation for the obligee. The transfer of obligations can be a
complete or a partial transfer. In the case of a complete transfer, the obligor
breaks the original contract relationship; the third party takes the place of the
original obligor and assumes the contract obligation. Scholars generally call
such complete transfers of liability "assumptions of obligation that exempt
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the transferor." In the case of partial transfers, the original obligor does not
break the obligation relationship. The third party joins the obligation
relationship and assumes the obligation to one obligee jointly with the
obligor. This arrangement is called a simultaneous assumption of
obligation.
So-called third party substitute performance ("third party
performance") refers to a situation in which a third party has not concluded
an agreement with the obligee or the obligor on the assignment of
obligations and does not become a contracting party, but voluntarily takes
the place of the obligor in performing the obligation. In most cases, the
obligor himself performs the contract. According to the principle of
freedom of contract, or from the perspective of protecting the interest of the
obligee, substitute performance of the obligation by a third party should be
legally valid as long as it does not violate the law or the contract, result in
losses for the obligee, or raise the costs of the obligee. This is so because in
essence, such a substitute performance conforms to the will and interests of
the obligee. Of course, obligations performed by third parties are duties that,
according to the nature of the law or the contract, do not have to be
performed by the obligor herself and for which the effect of performance by
the third party is the same as performance by the obligor.
There are superficial similarities between the assumption of an
obligation and third party performance. A third party performing is like a
substitute obligor assuming an obligation. Thus, some people think that if a
system of contract assignment is provided for in the Uniform Contract Law,
then it is not necessary to provide for a system of third party substitute
performance. This view is inappropriate, because there are obvious
differences between the assumption of obligations and third party substitute
performance of an obligation.
First, in the assumption of an obligation, both the obligor and obligee
reach agreement with the third party on the transfer of the obligation.
Regardless of whether the obligor or obligee reaches agreement with a third
party on the transfer of an obligation, the consent of the other party must be
obtained or the transfer cannot become effective. However, in the case of
third party performance, the third party unilaterally declares that he is
satisfying the obligation in place of the obligor or concludes an agreement
with the obligor to take his place in satisfying the obligation. The validity of
the expression of substitute performance is not effective against the obligee,
and the obligor does not need to request performance of the obligation
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directly from the third party. In this sense, the assumption of payment can
be called an "internal assumption of obligation." 50
Second, in an assumption of obligation, the obligor has already
become a party to the contract. If the entire obligation is assigned, then the
third party completely takes the place of the obligor, the obligor is free of the
contractual relationship, and the original contractual relationship is
extinguished. However, in the case of substitute performance by a third
party, the third party is only the performing party and is not an obligor. The
obligor can treat the third party only as a person assisting with performance
of the obligation and not as a contracting party. A person assisting with
performance is a person that, from the perspective of the obligor, assists the
obligor in performing the obligation. There are two principal types of
assisting persons. The first is an agent of the obligor and the second is
person who is not an agent but who performs the obligation according to the
intent of the obligor. There is generally some kind of employment contract
or relationship of trust between a person assisting with performance and the
obligor, but there is no contractual relationship between this person and the
obligee. Therefore, the obligor is responsible to the obligee for the acts of
the person assisting with performance.
Third, in the case of an assumption of obligation, if the third party
does not perform the contract obligation, the obligee can directly request that
the third party perform the contract or assume liability for breach of contract
because this person has become a party to the contract. If the third party has
completely taken the place of the obligor, then the obligee cannot demand
that the obligor perform the obligation or assume liability for breach. In the
case of third party substitute performance, the obligor should assume civil
liability for the nonperformance of the obligation if the performance by the
third party is not appropriate. In addition, the obligee can only request that
the obligor, and not the third party, assume liability. As Article 329 of the
German Civil Code provides: "If one party contracts to assume the duty to
satisfy the obligee of the other party but does not assume the obligation, if
doubt arises, the obligee cannot be regarded to have obtained the right to
demand satisfaction from this party."
I think that because there are obvious differences between the
assumption of an obligation and third party substitute performance, the two are
not interchangeable. As such, the law must make clear provisions for both the
transfer of contractual obligations and for third party substitute performance.
50 COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW, supra note 42, at 299.
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A related issue is the relationship between contract modification and
contract assignment. Many scholars think that contract transfer and
modification cannot be separated. In their view, modifications include
changes to the contracting parties (such as in an assignment of the contract)
as well as changes in the content of the contract. Thus, the Uniform
Contract Law should not separate the two. I think that there are some
substantive differences between the two concepts because contract
assignment ordinarily leads to a change in the contracting parties. In the
case of assignment, a third party takes the place of the original obligor or
obligee or joins the obligee as a party to the contractual relationship.
Changing the contracting parties often leads to the dissolution of the original
contract or creates a new contract. However, in the case of contract
modification, the parties are only amending the content of the original
contract. The contractual relationship thus remains valid. Also,
modification only involves two people and does not involve third parties.
Thus, I think that contract modification and assignment should be regarded
as distinct in the Uniform Contract Law.
XIV. SUBROGATION RIGHTS
Subrogation rights are an important part of the system of contract
preservation. There are two basic forms of contract preservation, namely
the obligee's right to void a contract5' and the right of subrogation.
Subrogation rights arise when an obligor does not exercise the rights she
enjoys against a third party to the detriment of her obligee's rights. In
such a situation, the obligee, in order to insure his own rights, can exercise
the obligation right of the obligor in his own behalf. This is called the
right of subrogation.5 2 Because the right of subrogation is a right given to
obligors under the law, both parties to a contract enjoy the right regardless
of whether they have agreed to it.
Current civil legislation in China does not yet provide for a system of
subrogation rights. Whether the Uniform Contract Law should provide for
51 Translator's Note: Here, the author is referring to the right of an obligee to petition a people's
court to void an obligor's transfer of assets to a third party when such a transfer is made for little or no
consideration. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52 Translator's Note: The Chinese word daiweiquan is commonly translated into English as a
"subrogation right." YINGHAN FALU CIDIAN [AN ENGLISH CHINESE DICTIONARY OF LAW] 1064 (1985).
However, the reader should note that the definition of the term subrogation in this Article differs from that
commonly used in American law. In the United States, subrogation refers to "the exchange of a third
person who has paid a debt in the place of the creditor to whom he has paid it, so that he may exercise
against the debtor all the rights which the creditor, if unpaid, might have done." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1427.
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subrogation is an issue worthy of inquiry. For the following reasons, it is
essential that the Uniform Contract Law contain provisions on subrogation.
First, with the development of a market economy, the number of debt disputes
is increasingly rapidly. For many reasons, however, the difficulty of trying
debt cases is growing. This shows that many obligors, in order to conceal
property or avoid debts, are intentionally refraining from asserting their own
rights to the point of even dispensing with their obligation rights. This not
only makes it difficult to enforce judgments in debt cases but also constitutes a
threat to transactional morality and the social economic order. Second,
without a system of subrogation rights, it will be difficult to ensure the
interests of obligees when obligors intentionally refrain from exercising their
obligation rights. An obligee can request that an obligor be declared bankrupt,
but the obligor may not yet meet the conditions for bankruptcy or bankruptcy
may be too extreme. In such cases, it may not be possible to resolve the
problems of the obligee as quickly as possible through a declaration of
bankruptcy. Thus, establishing a system of subrogation and permitting
obligees to exercise obligation rights in the place of their obligors is essential.
With regards to the system of subrogation rights, several difficult issues
must be explored. The first is the scope within which subrogation rights may
be exercised. It is generally believed that subrogation rights should only be
exercised to the extent necessary to protect an obligation right. This is to say
that subrogation rights can only be exercised when there is a danger that
obligation rights will not be realized. If the property of the obligor is sufficient
to satisfy an obligation, then the obligor need only petition a court to forcefully
execute on the property of the obligor. In such cases, the obligation right can
be realized and it is unnecessary for the obligee to exercise the right of
subrogation. If an obligee exercises a right of the obligor through subrogation
and the exercise of this right is sufficient to protect the obligee's own
obligation right, then the obligee should not exercise additional rights of the
obligor through subrogation. It should be observed that a subrogated obligee
should exercise the rights of the obligor in the obligee's own name and not in
the name of the obligor. Finally, the obligee may not dispose of the rights of
the obligor. (For example, the obligation right exercised through subrogation
may not be assigned or extinguished.) Finally, in the process of exercising
subrogation rights, the obligee must act as a fiduciary of the obligor. If the
obligation is not handled properly and the obligor suffers injury, then the
obligee should assume liability for damages. The Uniform Contract Law must
clearly provide the form in which subrogation rights may be exercised. It must
also provide that such rights may only be exercised in order to protect
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obligation rights and must prevent obligees exercising such rights from
harming obligors and third persons.
The second issue is the relationship between subrogation rights and
contract relativity.53 It is generally believed that the exercise of subrogation
rights is a manifestation of the external validity of contracts. This is to say,
when subrogation rights are exercised, the obligation right of the obligee is not
only valid with respect to the obligor but also with respect to third persons
indebted to the obligor ("a third party obligor"). I think that in reality, the
exercise of subrogation rights is valid with respect to third persons. This is a
special kind of validity provided for by law. It is not based on the agreement
of the parties and does not fundamentally change the rule of contract relativity.
Instead, the obligor must still adhere to the rule of contract relativity in
exercising the right of subrogation. Any interests obtained by the obligee in
exercising the rights of his obligor belong to the obligor. The obligee may not
request that the third party obligor perform the obligation for him directly.
Because there is no relationship of obligation between the obligee and the third
party obligor, the third party obligor does not pay the obligee and the obligor
has the duty to accept satisfaction of the obligation. Direct performance for
the obligee not only breaks the rule of contract relativity, but also harms the
interests of other obligors who have not exercised subrogation rights (i.e. when
the obligee is obligated to other parties).
Several related issues are whether an obligee, after exercising
subrogation rights, has first priority to be compensated from payments
obtained through the exercise of the subrogation right and whether such an
obligee has this priority if the third party obligor voluntarily performs for
him. I think that the purpose of exercising subrogation rights is to preserve
the property of an obligor. Thus, the property of the obligor jointly
guarantees the rights of all obligees. It does not matter whether every
obligee exercises subrogation rights; under the principle of the equality of
obligation rights, all obligees should have the right to be compensated
equally from the property of the obligor. Giving priority to an obligee that
exercises subrogation rights is not in accord with the nature of obligation
rights and will harm the interests of other obligees.
The third issue is whether subrogation rights should be exercised
through litigation. Two methods of exercising subrogation rights have been
adopted in the laws of foreign countries. These are the litigation method and
self-help method. Obligees may use either method to exercise their
subrogation rights. In China, some scholars advocate permitting obligees to
53 See supra, Part III.
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adopt the self-help method. 4 Presently in China, however, many parties to
transactions still lack a deep consciousness of the law, the concept of
contract, and the extreme threat that the debt crisis poses to the transactional
order. Given this situation, I think that permitting obligees to exercise their
subrogation rights through self-help would result in property disputes,
arbitrary dispositions of obligors' property to fulfill the obligation rights of
obligees, and other problems. If the litigation method is adopted, these
problems can be effectively avoided and unnecessary disputes that stem
from the exercise of subrogation rights can be effectively prevented. In
particular, the litigation method guarantees that subrogation rights are
exercised only to protect obligation rights and that other interests outside of
obligation rights are not protected. Therefore, obligees should follow the
procedures for forceful execution of judgments before they are permitted to
satisfy their obligations with interests obtained through the exercise of
subrogation rights.
XV. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
The concept of impossibility of performance ("impossibility")
occupies a very important place in German contract law and in the contract
regimes of civil law countries influenced by German law. This concept can
generally be divided into initial impossibility and subsequent impossibility.
Initial impossibility is a problem of obligation formation, while subsequent
impossibility is a problem of obligation performance. These two problems
are the two basic problems of contract. As the Taiwanese scholar Wang
Zejian has noted, "Impossibility of performance is one of core problems of
contract law."55 However, scholars have two sharply divergent views on
whether or not the system of impossibility should be adopted in China's
Uniform Contract Law. My basic view is that China's Uniform Contract
Law should not borrow this system. The two components of the system of
impossibility are analyzed below.
A. Initial Impossibility and the Invalidity of Contracts
The concept of initial impossibility first arose in Roman law when the
Roman legal scholar Celsus advanced the proposition, "obligations that are
impossible to perform are void" (impossibilium nulla obligatio est). This
s4 Yang Lixin, Lun Zhaiquanren de Daiweiquan [Discussion of the Subrogation Rights of Obligees],
FALU KEXUE [LEGAL SCI.], No. 4, 1990.
55 WANG, supra note 25, at 415.
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view greatly influenced German law. In 1853, the German legal scholar
Mommasen, in related writings, stressed that if a contract is impossible to
perform when it is formed, then the contract should be declared void. This
view was fully adopted in Article 306 of the German Civil Code. According
to this Article, "a contract for an impossible performance is void." This
German provision was copied in Article 246 of the Civil Code of Chinese
Taiwan, which states, "a contract for an impossible performance is void.,
56
On the surface, it is logical that initially impossible contracts should
be considered void contracts. If a contract cannot be performed when it is
concluded, then it is unnecessary to maintain the validity of the contract and
the contract should be declared void. In reality, however, this is not the
case. Article 306 of the German Civil Code overlooks two things. First, this
provision does not consider the reasons for the invalidity of the contract.
Declaring contracts void in all cases of initial impossibility expands the
scope of invalidity too far. Doing so could force contracting parties who are
not at fault to bear the unfavorable consequences of a void contract.
Because such parties do not know that the performance of the other party is
not possible, they may incur certain costs in performing the agreed upon
contract because they believe that the contract is valid. A void contract will
not only damage the reliance interest of this party but will also damage its
expectation interest. It may not be possible to restore all of these interests.
If some contracts are not simply declared void, then parties not at fault can
bring actions for breach based on the valid contract. This method may be of
greater benefit to such parties.
Second, situations involving initial impossibility are extremely
complex. In some situations, performing the contract is not absolutely
impossible. This is true, for example, when a party is unable to pay or
encounters some other economic difficulty with performance. In addition, if
the obligor cannot perform because of illness, then it still may be possible
for the contract to be performed. However, it may be inappropriate for the
law to compel performance by this party. If initially impossible contracts
are all declared void, then the parties in some contractual relationships will
exploit the provisions on invalidity and, using initial impossibility as an
excuse, turn contracts that can and should be performed into void contracts.
Thus, simply declaring contracts void in all such situations may not be
beneficial to transactional security and may not conform to the interests of
the contracting parties, particularly those of the obligee.
56 Translator's Note: For an English translation of the Civil Code of Chinese Taiwan, see MINFA
[CIVIL CODE], translated in MAJOR LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN (James C. Liu et al. eds.,
1991).
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The problems of initial impossibility have been resolved relatively
effectively in China's legislation and judicial practice. According to Articles
59 and 61 of the GPCL, when there is a serious misunderstanding regarding
a civil act, the act can be voided. In such cases, the party at fault should
assume liability for the voiding of the contract. Cases in which two parties
mistakenly believe that the object of a contract exists when in fact it does
not, or that some object exists when in fact that type of object does not, can
be handled as serious mistakes. After the serious mistake occurs, the party
with the right to void the contract should decide whether to void it and thus
make it void from its inception. This can solve some problems with
impossibility that arise from mistake. In China's judicial practice, situations
in which one party (the seller) clearly knows that she does not have the
ability to perform, and intentionally signs a contract, are handled as fraud.
57
A situation in which a party, through its own fault, loses the object of the
contract before concluding the contract is not a situation involving force
majeur and can be handled as a breach of contract. In all, since the problems
of initial impossibility have already been resolved relatively well in China's
present legislation and judicial practice, it is not necessary to import the
German concept of initial impossibility. Doing so would only cause
unnecessary irrationality in the law.
B. Subsequent Impossibility and Breach of Contract.
Another important kind of impossibility is subsequent impossibility.
This concept relates to the problems of performance and breach of contract.
According to German law, an obligor should be responsible if the
impossibility of performance can be attributed to him. In German law,
impossibility of performance and delay of performance are the two forms of
contract breach. Every other more sophisticated type of breach is
encompassed within these two forms. Thus, German law creates a system
for "dichotomizing" the forms of contract breach.
I think that impossibility of performance cannot be an independent
form of breach and can only be an objective factual state. Any form of
contract breach can give rise to the problem of impossibility. In particular,
impossibility can occur for many reasons in the process of performing a
contract. If impossibility is treated as an independent form of breach, then it
will be difficult to distinguish between impossibility and other forms of
57 Supreme People's Court, Response on Several Problems Concerning the Specific Application of
Economic Contract Law in Adjudicating Economic Contract Disputes (1987).
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breach. Of course, the occurrence of impossibility will influence the form of
remedy used. In a situation involving impossibility, the contract cannot be
performed. Consequently, compensation for damages is substituted for
actual performance. This is not because impossibility is an independent
form of contract breach, however.
Because impossibility is only a state of fact, it cannot be taken to
cover other forms of contract breach. As such, China's contract law cannot
recognize this term as covering forms of breach. Contract law should start
from Chinese reality in constructing a system for acts of breach. It should
fix different constituent elements and remedies in accordance with different
types of contract breach. By so doing, the law will give play the utility of
the system of contract liability in maintaining the legal interests of the
parties and the transactional order.
